We assess the conceptual and empirical features of a number of house price series for the United States. We then calculate a measure of the net upgrading of the existing stock of houses that took place during the period and adjust price indexes for this net increase in quality. Judgments about the trend, volatility, and determinants of house prices are shown to depend crucially on which price series is used. The Freddie Mac upgradeadjusted house price measure rose 5.7% over the past four decades, falling 7.7% from 1950 through 1970 before rising 14.5% from 1970 through 1989. Real house prices declined in the early 1980s as a result of the increase in real after-tax interest rates and the decline in real materials costs. The recovery of house prices in the late 1980s is attributed to lower unemployment and real after-tax interest rates and particularly to demographic.factors associated with the aging of baby boomers.
Research in real estate has long been hampered by the quality of price data for various categories of real estate. In spite of the long-standing importance of real estate as a household and a business asset and in spit~ of the wide variety of alternative price series currently available for singlefamily homes, data limitations persist. Though it is common to hear references to "house prices," none of the currently available series adequately measures what we presume is meant by the term: the nationalaverage, quality-adjusted price of the stock of structures plus lots ("houses") . Because different series embody different concepts of house prices, which series is most useful depends on the purpose at hand. Some series track prices of new hous,es; some measure the prices of existing houses. Most measure the prices of structures and lot, although the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis' implicit d~flator for residential investment excludes land value.
Some attempt to control for quality change over time; others do not. A house price series that does not adjust for increasing quality over time will produce an upward-biased measure of the increase in the price of a u~it of housing services. Yet no currently available house price data series completely adjusts the national-average price of the existing stock of houses (including land value) for quality change over a long time span.
House price measures with and without land may differ substantially. To the extent that both the short-run and the long-run price elasticities of land supply are lower than those of construction labor and materials., an increase in the demand for houses may raise land's share of the value of structure and lot. In fact, differences in land's share account for much of the variation in house prices through time and across regions. According to the National Association of Home Builders' Construction Cost Survey, the cost of the finished lot comprised 11% of the total cost of a typical new house in 1949, 21% by 1969, and 27% by 1988. Thus, house price measures that omit land value are likely to be severely biased downward over the past four decades. For example, the real residential investment deflator rose by 0. 8% between 1949 and 1988 . This increase coupled with the increase in land's share of total value over this period implies an increase in real house prices of 22.9%. I
Two methods of obtaining quality-adjusted price series for existing houses have been employed, the hedonic technique and the repeat-sales approach. For example, Thibodeau [28] has derived quality-adjusted price
IThe relationship between the value of structures (VS), land (VL) and houses (VH) ,is VH = VS + VL. If s represents land's share of total house value, VL = sVH, and VH : VS/(I -s).
indexes based on hedonic techniques for ten years for a number of cities.
Unfortunately, insufficient data exist to produce such an index for house prices nationwide over a long time span. The repeat-sales method compares the prices of individual houses that are resold over time (for example, Abraham and Schauman [2] and Case and Shiller [8] ). While this largely controls for quality, provided maintenance, repair, and other expenditures are only just sufficient to offset depreciation, net upgrading of the existing stock of houses can produce upward-biased measures of the increase in the price of -constant~quality houses.
When quality change is not explicitly controlled for, non-repeat-sales indexes are biased by the changing composition of transactions. Measures l.ike the average or median sales price reflect the combination of shifts in prices of houses of constant quality, as well as shifts in the average quality of houses sold. An increase in incomes or a decrease in financing costs, for example, would be expected to lead to an increase in the price of houses of a given quality as well as a shift in sales toward houses of~higher quality (Hendershott and Thibodeau [17] ). The resulting systematic measurement errors in the dependent variable would bias regression estimates of income and interest rate effects on house prices. Measured price increases and regression estimates would also be biased if houses that have appreciated relatively more are sold relatively more frequently. That might occur if house price appreciation itself provided the additional equity to allow homeowners ,constrained by loan-to-value limits to "trade up" to higher-quality housing.
Biased measures of price increases can also result from non-random sampling of transactions. Truncation bias will result if houses in different price categories appreciate at different rates and the price series excludes observations from some price categories; for example, those financed with above-ceiling mortgages. The conforming loan ceiling imposed on federally sponsored agencies operating in the secondary market and the ceiling on thẽ size of FHA-insured loans may produce such biases over either the short run or the long run. However, to the extent that ceilings move in response to market conditions, this bias is attenuated. If the ceilings move sluggishly but completely in response to changes in general market prices, short-run bias may be considerable but little or no long-run bias will be present. Table I lists Only the FHA series and the BEA's implicit deflator for residential investment series are available before 1963. Because the demand for data may be importantly driven by significant variance and by chanqes in the general level of (real or nominal) house prices, the lack of data may indicate that neither was large nor of particular concern much before the 1970s.2 1ndeed, the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center Survey of Consumer Attitudes shows that people judged house prices to be high in the 1970s, but relatively low from the mid 1950s to the mid 1960s and, perhaps surprisingly, in the 1980s. From the late 1960s through the early 1980s, about 25% of respondents claimed it was a bad time to buy because house price levels were high, while only about 5% claimed it was a good time to buy because prices were low. From the mid 1950s until the late 1960s, the percentage responding that house prices were low rose from about 5 to about 20%, while the percent responding that prices were high fell from about 25 to about 15%. In the 1980s, However, this bias has been mitigated by the frequent raising of the FHA ceiling in response to house price increases. 4 Indeed, median FHA house prices fell relative to the FHA ceiling throughout much of the period. This may suggest that truncation bias has lessened over time.
Data Characteristics
The NAR measure of the median sales price of existing single-family houses, available since 1968, is probably the most widely known measure of house prices. The disadvantages of this series are that it reflects changes in the composition and quality of houses sold and that it is not available for a long period of time.
We consider three house price measures from the Housing Sales Survey of the Bureau of the Census and include two in our analysis. This survey contains information on the physical characteristics and sales prices of new, about 20% responded that house prices were low, while about 10% referred to then as high.
3The sample is further limited by excluding cash transactions, as is also the case with the OTS series. Further bias is possible in the price series to the extent that the distribution of cash sales differs from sales that involve credit.
4Greenlees ' [13] in-depth investigation of this issue concluded that truncation bias in the case of FHA data was likely to be negligible. 6A new version of the quality-adjusted series beginning in 1977 is also available. It uses 1987 as the base year for quality comparisons, while the earlier series was based on typical 1982 houses, a change that could, but in practice dqes not, make much difference. This series omits a_D_Z explicit adjustment for changes in lot size or value, which typically is one of the most important determinants of house prices in hedonic models. Because this series is available only since 19}7, we have not included it in our analysis. 1°For an early example o.f the repeat-sales technique, see Bailey, Muth, and Nourse [4] , and more recently, Case and Shiller [8] . Housing demand studies find that more housing quality is demanded as real incomes rise (Mayo [22] ). The long-run increase in real incomes then will raise the (quality-unadjusted) average price of purchased houses relative to the price Of "constant-quality" houses. While the Census constant-quality 11Throughout, real values are obtained by deflating nominal values by the implicit price deflator for GNP.
12For ~his series, the standard deviations of the residuals were obtained by regressing the logarithm of each real house price series on a constant and a linear time trend. The percentage variationwas then calculated as follows: The base of the natural logarithm was raised to the power of the standard deviation of the residuals. One is then subtracted. That difference is then multipllied by 100. series rises only 14% from 1963 to 1989, the unadjusted average price series rises by 98%. This implies that the quality of new homes has risen by 74% ((1.98/1.14)-I) over the past quarter-century. 13 Thus, according to the Census series, quality change accounts for three-fourths of the increase in these real new house prices over thi~ period. However, this series, discontinued in 1989, may .overestimate the increase in quality since the late 1970s. The Census revised hedonic-based model indicates that between 1977 and 1989 prices rose 12 percent more, and quality concomitantly less, than estimated by its previous model.
The series that rises least (13%) from 1963 through 1989 is the deflator for residential investment. Its relatively slow growth is not too surprising given that it is quality-adjusted and that it omits the value of land, whose relative price rose markedly over this period. That the residential investment deflator is the least volatile series suggests that much of the short-run movement in house (i.e., structure and lot) prices is attributable to changes in land value.
Quality Change in the Exitsting Housing Stock
The large increase over time in the Census average price series relative to the quality-adjusted price series indicates that new houses have increased in quality. The average quality of existing houses rises through time both because the quality of new houses flowing into the stock rises and because 13The implied 2.1 annual percentage change is virtually the same as that reported by Hendershott and Thibodeau [17] .
141ts volatility may also be reduced by the BEA procedure of using a threequarter moving average of the underlying single-family structure price series in constructing the residential deflator. 13 existing houses are upgraded.
The amount of net upgrading can be obtained from data on the net investment in the existing stock of houses. The U.S. Department of Commerce measure of the net stock of residential structures is based on the assumption of straight-line physical depreciation over 80 years (i.e., 1.25% annually). 15 Offsetting the decline in quality associated with depreciation is the gross flow of expenditures made to maintain and to upgrade the quality of houses (Apgar [3] ). The Bureau of the Census [31] reports expenditures, in real terms, on residential property maintenance, repair, and improvements.
Typically, over half of such expenditures are classified as "improvements."
"Additions and alterations" are generally about 40% of expenditures. Indeed, the Bureau of the Census [29] reports that the following percentages of existing homes underwent these repairs, improvements, or alterations during 1985 and 1986: 5% built additions, 8% remodeled kitchens, 9% remodeled bathrooms, 14% bought and installed storm windows or doors, 9% added insulation, and 19% reported other major work. The Censu~ [31] estimated that over $60 billion was spent to maintain, repair, and upgrade all owner-occupied properties in 1988.
We use the Census data as a starti~ng point in calculating the net percentage increase in the real net stock of residential structures and lots that is due to the net upgrading of the existing stock. Net investment is obtained by subtracting from gross investment the real value of physical depreciatiQn, which is the product of the Commerce Department's physical 15See Palmquist [24] and Randolph [26, 27] for estimates of the physical depreciation rate for housing. 1.25% is greater than the average depreciation rate in the studies surveyed by Randolph [26] . Some of those estimates refer to multi-family and other rental housing, which may have different, perhaps lower, depreciation rates than owner-occupied and single-family units. depreciation rate for residential structures and its estimate of the stock of real net residential structures. This real net investment is then.divided by a measure of the real net residential capital stock (including land value) to obtain the real net percentage increase in the quality of the existing oresidential capital stock. 16 The resulting measure deliberately omits upgrading of the stock due to the inflow of higher quality houses.
This measure underestimates gross and net investment, and thus net upgrading, to the extent that unmeasured labor time is used to repair, renovate, or otherwise maintain or improve the quality of housing at a given location. To make allowance for this-widespread phenomenon, we have included an estimate of the value of unmeasured labor time, or "sweat equity." The Census reports separate data for materials purchased by homeowners and for payments to contractors. Because the value of materials is approximately equal to the value of labor in market-based construction generally (Baily and Gordon [5] ), we assumed that the value of homeowners' labor time would be about the same as the value of the materials they purchased. The U.S. Bureau of the Census [31] reports that about half of materials used for projects of this type are purchased by homeowners, while the other half are provided through builders. In the late 1980s, the value of materials purchased by homeowners, and thus the estimated value of unmeasured labor time, is about 25% of total expenditures on owner-occupied properties. Since expenditures on owner-occupied properties are about 60% of total outlays, we raised gross measured outlays for materials and labor on all properties by 15% to allow for 16The value Of land is obtained by using the Commerce Department estimate of the net residential capital stock, whiCh only includes structure value, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [6] ratio of the household sector's ownership of residential structures and land. 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 '1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 !8 coefficient of 0.70. And as we shall see below, these series also respond considerably differently to economic and demographic forces. 
Determinants of House Prices
18Because financing costs can also affect the supply function for housing, the reduced-form coefficient associated with financing costs can be expected to reflect both influences, though the demand effect is likely to dominate. [32] ). The supply of land to urban uses holding quality constant, particularly its accessibility, is very likely to be upward sloped. Case and Kopcke [7] show that the real per square foot price of land five to ten miles from the center of Boston rose at a compound annual rate of 1.9 percent between 1850 and 1950; since then it has risen at a faster rate on average. It seems more reasonable to account for the persistent !ncrease in real land prices in part by demand sliding up a positively sloped land supply curve, rather than exclusively by a horizontal supply curve for land shifting upward.
To proxy for shifts in the housing supply function due to changes in the relative price of construction materials, we include RPCON, the log of the The relative price of construction-materials is taken to be predetermined. To the extent that, instead, causality runs from changes in the demand for houses to the relative price of construction materials, OLS estimates of the reduced-form equation for real house prices (3) will be affected by simultaneity bias. To assess whether shifts in the demand for houses are likely to have been an important source of changes in RPCON over the 1950-89 period, RPCON was regressed on the other, presumably predetermined determinants of demand (UGAP, RATMR, INC, HH, and POP2Os, as described more fully below). One signal of the endogeneity of the relative price of construction materials with respect td house prices would be its significant positive reaction to increases in the determinants of the demand for houses.
However, over the 1950-89 period, little evidence of such a reaction is found.
Real after-tax interest rates and the demographic variable POP20s are each statistically insignificant, and, while the unemployment rate and the household and income variables are statistically significant, increases in the demand for houses emanating from these sources are estimated to reduce the relative price of materials.
Unemployment and Interest Rate Effects
The cyclical component of the unemployment rate, UGAP, is included to allow for the possibility that income constra~ints, uncertainty, and other factors associated with the transitory departures of real income from its underlying trend affect the demand for houses. UGAP is calculated as the difference between the actual unemployment rate and the natural, or equilibrium,, rate. 19
The nominal after-tax mortgage interes~ rate has been calculated as the secondary-market yield on FHA mortgages times one minus the DRI series for the average marginal federal income tax rate. 2° In the absence of a data series for the expected lonq-term inflation rate, the expected real rate was obtained 19Values for the natural rate of unemployment for 1950 -1988 are taken from the Congressional Budget Office [9] . The 1989 value is set equal to the 1988 value. The Congressional Budget Office [9] uses the values from Gordon [12] for its estimates for 1950 -1980. 2°See Poterba [25] for illustrations of the substantial changes in after-tax housing costs during the 1980s.
by subtracting the Livingston survey inflation rate expectation for the upcoming year. In order to assess whether our results were sensitive to this particular formulation, other specifications were also tested. To match the interest rate and expected inflation rate maturities (at one year), onẽ asure (RATS) subtracted the Livingston expected inflation rate from the after-tax Treasury bill rate measured on a bond-equivalent basis. Another 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 RATMR RATS RATTB RATTP It is widely accepted that the demand for houses rises fairly steeply with real income per household (Hendershott [15] ). INC is the logarithm.of real income per constant-age-household. INC is designed to capture the effects of changes in real income per household over time, apart from those arising from :hanges in the age-earnings profile. The effect of changing age structure on the age-earnings profile will be described below and proxied by the variable Similarly, the greater the number of households, the greater the demand for houses. HH is the~logarithm of the number of households weighted by the average tendency of various categories of households to be homeowners.
Homeownership rates by age reflect (I) the progression along the typical upward slope of the age-earnings profile and (2) the greater desire of older households to own their own homes (Hendershott [15] Another demographically based effect operates through the ratio of households headed by a person aged 20 to 29 to those whose head is aged 30 to 54 (POP2Os), which captures the change in the age-earnings profile brought on by changes in the age structure of the labor force.~2 As a demographic bulge like the baby boom flows into the labor force, the ratio df the number of young to older workers rises. As a result, the real incomes of individual baby boomers are temporarily depressed, thereby steepening their age-earnings profiles (Freeman [Ii] , Welch [35] ). POP2Os, plotted in Figure 4 , began to rise as the first baby boomers entered their twenties in the late 1960s. Thẽ
IThe "long-run" average homeownership rates by age and marital status are averages of the rates calculated from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 decennial Censuses of Ho~using~and Housing Vacancy Survey, taken from Hendershott [16] . The data for the numberer households by age and marital status are taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census [33] .
2~For a more detailed discussion of demographic effects on income and.the demand for houses, see Lapkoff, Peek and Wilcox [18] . The ratio of young to older households is highly correlated (0.98) with the ratio of young to older population. Individual baby boomers' incomes can be expected to rise faster than the historical average age-earnings profile would indicate because, as they age, they become closer substitutes for other, older workers. This atypically rapid income growth, combined with lenders' practices that impose payment-toincome ceilings without regard to age, unleashes baby boomers' "pent-up" demand for houses. The easing of borrowing constraints implies greater demand for houses than would be predicted by specifications that ignore the "catchup" of baby boomer real incomes. Table 3 (FRED-ADJ), and statistically insignificant otherwise. In no case is the coefficient's t-statistic larger than 2.4. The lack of compelling evidence that transitory unemployment affects the prices of long-term assets is not particularly surprising. On the other hand, because we take FRED-ADJ (bottom row of table 3) to be the most appropriate of these house price series, we place relatively more weight on the finding that cyclically higher unemployment rates lower house prices.
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Empirical Evidence
Six out of eight price series respond negatively to real after-tax interest rates. The series that deliver positive interest rate effects are two of the most widely used series, the Census constant-quality series and the residential investment deflator. Based on the FRED-ADJ results, however, higher real after-tax mortgage interest rates lower real house prices. This effect is statistically significant and substantial: a 1 percentage point increase in this interest rate reduces house prices by 1 3/4%.
In contrast to the unemployment and interest rate coefficient estimates, the other coefficients are uniformly signed across price s~ries. The coefficients on INCHH are always significant, though they span a wide range: from about 0.1 to about 1.0. The estimated POP20s coefficients are always negative, and significantly so for four .of the price series. Higher materials costs raise every measure of house prices, significantly in five out of eight cases. In the preferred FRED-ADJ specification, the estimated coefficient on RPCON of 0.422 is reassuringly close to materials' share (about one-half) of total construction costs. Table 4 is a hybrid series whose reliability is presumably greater for the post-1970 period. This series is plotted in Figure 4 . Values of the variables used in Table 4 are listed in the Appendix.
Rows I, 3, and 5 in Table 4 present OLS results. The top row shows the FRED-ADJ results, which do not differ greatly from those in Table 3 The results in row 6 are consistent with the arguments presented above, that effects on house prices of changes in the aggregate demand for houses operate primarily through changes in the price of land. The residential investment deflator, the series that omits land value, responds significantly only to RPCON, the proxy for supply curve shifts. Contrary to Mankiw and Weil [21] , we are unable to detect demand effects on the residential investmend eflator. Neither after-tax real interest rates, long-run or short-run movements in income, nor demographic factors had any statistically significant effect on this particular measure of house prices, although each of these factors did affect the quality-adjusted Freddie Mac series with statistically significant coefficients of the predicted sign.
We also investigated the extent to which financial forces other than those operating through RATMR and the steepening of the age-earnings profile have affected house prices. The high and variable nominal interest rates in the 1970s and 1980s are sometimes suggested as important determinants of household spending (Manchester [20] , Linneman and Wachter [19] and Wilcox [36] ). In particular, we looked to see if the demand for housing has been 23A Dickey-Fuller test of the OLS residuals produced a t-statistic of -4.27, allowing us to reject their being non-stationary. On that basis, we acceptedthe formulation in the top row of table 4 as a co-integrated relation. Estimation of an error-correction formulation based on that co-integr,ated relation produced a significantly (t=-3.23) negative error-correction term coefficient (-0.55).
restrained by borrowing constraints associated with nominal interest rates.
In general, given the inclusion of real after-tax rates, nominal (before-tax) interest rate coefficients were found to be insignificant, so we have not reported them here. 24
Decomposition of House Price Movements Table 5 uses the coefficient estimates from the top row of Table 4 to obtain the percentage change in real house prices over various subperiods attributable to each of the explanatory variables. The difference between the actual and the explained movement over each of the subperiods is the residual.
The top row in Table 5 shows that, after'rising a little in the 1950s, real house prices fell by more than 9% during the 1960s. That decline can be accounted for by the decline in real construction materials costs. In the 1970s, real house prices rose by nearly as much as they fell in the 1960s.
The combination of higher real materials costs and the decline in real aftertax interest rates in the 1970s more than offset the depressing effect of higher unemployment and the reduction in the average age of the labor force.
Between 1980 and 1984 real house prices fell about 11%. Over half of that decline is attributed to the enormo.us increase in real after-tax interest rates ( Figure 3 ). Further downward pressure on house prices emanated from the decline in the cost of construction materials. Some of this downward pressure was offset by demographic factors. In the late 1980s, real house prices rose Z4One'~nteresting pattern did _emerge in this regard, however, when we split the sample approximately in half. Estimates based on the sample containing data before 1970 indicated that nominal interest rates had significant negative effects on house prices, while real rates did not; in the second half ofthe sample, the opposite pattern held. It is surprising that nominal interest rates were found to be insignificant here, given their significance in equations explaining consumer spending (Wilcox [36] ). Real house prices are estimated to decline with increases in real aftertax interest rates, and rise with both cyclical and more permanent income increases and increases in the relative cost of materials. Demographic factors such as the size and age distribution of the population are also significant determinants of house prices.
The future course of house prices is of interest to current and prospective homeowners, homebuilders, lenders, mortgage insurers, and policymake~s. Forecasting house prices far into the future is inherently 25The large unexplained increase in house prices may have resulted from.the sharp rise in the conforming loan limit in the late 1980s. Similarly, the unexplained decline in the early 1980s may have been related to the. failure of the loan limit to keep pace with housing market conditions. difficult. Baby boomers will continue to age, however, and as they do, their demand for houses and, hence, house prices are likely to increase~-for two reasons. First, baby boomers' propensity for homeownership is likely to increase as they age, even apart from re~l income increases. In this regard, baby boomers may differ little from the generations that preceded them, and on this count, the demand for houses is likely to rise for at least the next two decades. Second, the sheer size of. the baby boom cohort appears to have significantly depressed the individual incomes of its members. A tapering-off of this cohort effect as they age would lead to boomers' real incomes growing at atypically rapid rates in coming years. To the extent the demand for houses is effectively constrained by borrowing limits that are specified in terms of current income, these income gains will stimulate the demand for houses. On the basis of the estimates presented here, that combination of increased desire and ability to own homes could be expected to raise real house prices by about 10% during the 1990s. 
